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Abstract
Background: Market Access Agreements (MAA) between pharmaceutical industry and health care payers have
been proliferating in Europe in the last years. MAA can be simple discounts from the list price or very sophisticated
schemes with inarguably high administrative burden.
Discussion: We distinguished and defined from the health care payer perspective three kinds of MAA: Commercial
Agreements (CA), Payment for Performance Agreements (P4P) and Coverage with Evidence Development (CED).
Apart from CA, the agreements assumed collection and analysis of real-life health outcomes data, either from a
cohort of patients (CED) or on per patient basis (P4P). We argue that while P4P aim at reducing drug cost to
payers without a systematic approach to addressing uncertainty about drugs’ value, CED were implemented
provisionally to reduce payer’s uncertainty about value of a medicine within a defined time period.
Summary: We are of opinion that while CA and P4P have a potential to reduce payers’ expenditure on costly
drugs while maintaining a high list price, CED address initial uncertainty related to assessing the real-life value of
new drugs and enable a final HTA recommendation or reimbursement and pricing decisions. Further, we suggest
that real cost to health care payers of drugs in CA and P4P should be made publicly available in a systematic
manner, to avoid a perverse impact of these MAA types on the international reference pricing system.
Background
Achieving broad market access for new pharmaceutical
products has become critical for their manufacturers.
This is because high price itself might not directly trans-
late into high revenue: sales volume might be reduced
drastically if an expensive pharmaceutical product falls
under scrutiny of health care payers and is refused reim-
bursement or is not recommended for use by health
technology assessment (HTA) process. While cost-effec-
tiveness analysis is primarily used to aid decision making
in the UK or Sweden, other countries (such as France or
Germany) might refer to “economic resource use” rather
than to specific type of analysis [1].
In practice, costly drugs are subject to market access
negotiation, i.e. finding a compromise between health
care payers and the industry on the drug’sp r i c ea n d
reimbursement status, HTA recommendation (for speci-
fic populations of patients) and/or formulary listing. The
outcome of this process can thus be called a Market
Access Agreement (MAA). Clearly, an obvious alterna-
tive to many often sophisticated MAA would be to
bring the drug’s list price closer to a level of a currently
used treatment option - a solution deemed unacceptable
by the industry, particularly in disease areas where many
generic therapeutic options are available. Even more so
because out of 27 EU member states, 24 use interna-
tional referencing to set prices of new drugs [2]. Conse-
quently, lowering the list price in one country might
result in lower prices in countries which will later use it
for reference. From this perspective, the industry may
choose to launch their drugs sequentially, starting from
countries where they are likely to achieve a high list
price [2].
In a recent review paper European payers distin-
guished two types of agreements: financially-based and
payment-for-performance [3]. We felt that there had
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payers on what were their motivations to implement
various types of schemes in their respective countries
a n dw h a ti m p a c ti tm i g h th a v eo np r i c e si np e e rE U
member states. Here, we present an opinion paper
based on a succinct review of MAA other than price-
volume agreements and market caps. We use a perspec-
tive of the health care payer and we attempt to classify
MAA according to characteristics such as collection and
analysis of real-life patient health outcomes and the
duration of the agreements (provisional or permanent).
Methodology
The aim of this debate paper is to contribute to the gen-
eral debate on Market Access Schemes based on infor-
mation which is published publicly by relevant national
health care payers in Europe. We used a review paper
written by public health care payers to identify European
Union countries where MAA were implemented (UK,
France, Italy, and Denmark) [3]. This paper was chosen
because it was a literature review supplemented by
unpublished or “grey literature” references known to 16
European co-authors, mostly health authority and health
insurance personnel evaluating and implementing such
schemes [3]. For the purpose of this paper we excluded
price-volume agreements and market caps, as well as
schemes that were direct-to-customer awareness/mar-
keting campaigns rather than MAA with health authori-
ties (i.e. the “140-90 initiative” for valsartan from
Novartis [4] and Bayer’ scheme on vardenafil [5] in Den-
mark). Additionally, we identified through personal
communication that MAA were launched in Sweden
[6]. Therefore, we searched websites of national HTA
and reimbursement authorities in UK (England and
Wales) (National Institute for Health and Clinical Excel-
lence (NICE) and Department of Health (DoH), Italy
(Agenzia Italiana del Farmaco (AIFA)), France (Haute
Authorite de Sante (HAS)), and Sweden (The Dental
and Pharmaceutical Benefits Agency (TLV)) for docu-
ments containing the following keywords: “risk-sharing”,
“patient access scheme”, “coverage with evidence devel-
opment’, “conditional coverage/reimbursement”, “out-
come guarantee”,r e g i s t r y ,“observational study” or
“payment/pay by performance”. Non-English documents
and websites were translated by native speakers. For
retrieved documents, we sought to identify additional
information in general Web resources and we provide
reference for each. All searches were performed between
September and December 2010. Because this paper is a
“debate communication” we did not use the standard lit-
erature review methodology and searches were per-
formed by one author. However, both authors were
independently involved in analysis and abstraction of
data.
Discussion
Review of Market Access Agreements
Table 1 summarizes MAA which we identified in docu-
mentation published by European health care payers on
their websites. Below, we analyse them with respect to
the collection and analysis of real-life patient health out-
comes and the duration of the agreements (provisional
or permanent).
Swedish TLV, which uses cost-effectiveness analysis to
inform its decision making, does not recommend for
reimbursement drugs which showed uncertain or high
(above a certain disease-specific threshold) ICER value.
Levodopa/carbidopa’s (duodopa(R)) path to final pricing
and reimbursement in Sweden went through a tempor-
ary (five-year long) MAA which aimed at generating
real-life evidence that would allow to reduce the value
of ICER and uncertainty around it [6-8]. Briefly, while
the product was granted provisional reimbursement at a
premium price at the time of initial manufacturer sub-
mission, additional cost-effectiveness analyses and fol-
low-up studies enabled TLV to make a final positive
reimbursement decision at the premium price. Another
example was a MAA for rimonabant in the treatment of
obesity, which was also granted an interim reimburse-
ment status for a period of two years. The final TLV
decision was conditional on additional data showing
long-term effects and cost-effectiveness of the drug in
real-world practice [7,9,10].
We identified two requests of the French Haute
Authorite de Sante (HAS) of real-life comparative stu-
dies which were expected to reduce uncertainty about
drugs’ real-life performance and enable final pricing. In
2005, the French pricing body Comité économique des
produits de santé (CEPS) asked the manufacturer of the
injectable antipsychotic risperidone (RisperdalConsta
LP) to perform a one-year study that should evidence
reduction in a rate of hospitalizations for patients trea-
ted with this drug as compared to other antipsychotics
(to be designed under supervision of Ministry of Health)
[11,12]. This ESCROW MAA assumed that while the
drug will be granted a premium list price (approximately
15-fold premium versus generic injectable LP antipsy-
chotics and almost 60% versus oral risperidone from
Janssen-Cilag), the company would receive payment
based on the price of cheaper comparators and the dif-
ference would be deposited as public funds in Caisse
des Dépôts et Consignations until results from the study
are available. Shall the results evidence reduction in hos-
pitalization rate, money would be transferred to the
company. Otherwise, social security services would
receive the funds. Another MAA requested by CEPS
and the French HTA agency Commission de Transpar-
ence was a real-life use study for glitazones (pioglitazone
and rosiglitazone) in type 2 diabetes. This 2 year
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expected to develop evidence that would support or
oppose manufacturer’s claim of a superior real-life effi-
cacy (time to introduction of an add-on therapy) than
previously observed in clinical trials.
We identified 19 various MAAs in Italy, but there
were no detailed technology appraisals available on
AIFA’s website. Overall, there were 12 MAAs for oncol-
ogy drugs: erlotinib (2006), sunitinib (2006), sorafenib
(in advanced renal cell carcinoma in 2006 and liver can-
cer in 2008), dasatinib (2007), bevacizumab (2008), lena-
lidomide (2008), temsirolimus (2008), bortezomib
(2009), cetuximab (2009), lapatinib (2009), panitumu-
mab (2009) and trabectedin (2009) [13]. The MAA
involved fixed discounts (from the list price) and/or
pay-backs for non-responding patients (100% or 50% of
the drug’s cost, all on per patient basis). While safety
and efficacy of the drugs were monitored in patient
registries, it is noteworthy that those MAA did not seek
to answer uncertainty about a clearly specified health
outcome and data collection in the registries was not
systematic with a high potential for various bias [14]. E.
g. it was estimated that in some regions of the country
only 50% of patients were covered by the registries and
no process had been put in place to ensure an unbiased
selection of patients which might have led to doctors
feeding records only for patients for which less adminis-
trative burden was expected [15].
In contrast, the CRONOS project launched by AIFA
to evaluate real-life effectiveness of Alzheimer’s Disease
drugs (donepezil, rivastigmine and galantamine)
assumed collection and analysis of well-defined health
outcomes from a cohort of patients. It was carried out
in a nationally representative sample of patients with
AD over a period of two years and the public insurer
reimbursed medicines only in patients who responded at
four months of treatment (while the cost for non-
responders was covered by manufacturers) [3,16].
Other examples of MAA which we identified in Italy
were for drugs indicated in chronic angina pectoris
(ivabradine) [17] and type 2 diabetes mellitus (sitagliptin,
vilagliptin and exenatide) [14,18]. These provisional
MAA were set up to monitor real-life use, collect epide-
miologic data as well as new efficacy and safety data for
re-assesment of price and/or reimbursement conditions
for the medicines by the Italian agency. The schemes
were run with a restriction of treatment initiation to
specialist centres, monitoring of clinical practice, adverse
events and withdrawals due to treatment failure [19].
In contrast to the above HTA agencies, NICE pub-
lishes drug appraisal documents which include detailed
information on any MAA in place. At the time of writ-
ing this article, 11 Patient Access Schemes (PAS) for ten
medicines were developed as a part of NICE appraisal
process [20] and all were financially-based agreements,
according to the DoH’s definition [21-23]. These medi-
cines were: erlotinib in non small cell lung cancer [24],
lenalidomide in multiple myeloma [25], ranibizumab in
acute wet macular degeneration [26], trabectedin in
advanced soft tissue sarcoma [27], gefitinib in non small
cell lung cancer [28], sunitinib in advanced and/or
metastatic renal cell cancer [29] and in gastrointestinal
stromal tumours [30], cetuximab in colorectal cancer
[31], certolizumab in rheumatoid arthritis [32], ustekinu-
mab in psoriasis [33], bortezomib in multiple myeloma
[34], azacitidine in myelodysplastic syndromes [35] and
Table 1 Market Access Agreements identified on websites of European health care payers and their classification
according to the typology proposed by authors
Market Access Agreement Analysis of health outcomes data from a





Two MAA for levodopa/carbidopa and rimonabant
in Sweden [6-10]
cohort provisional CED
12 MAA for oncology drugs in Italy [13] cohort and per patient provisional P4P or CA
One MAA for three Alzeimer’s Disease drugs in Italy
[3,16]
cohort and per patient provisional CED
Three MAA for angina pectoris and resistant type 2
diabetes drugs in Italy [14,17-19]
cohort provisional CED
11 MAA developed as a part of NICE appraisal
process [21-36]
per patient** permanent** P4P or CA;
(CED**)
One MAA for Multiple Sclerosis drugs in UK [3,37] cohort provisional CED
Two MAA for type 2 diabetes drugs in France [12] cohort provisional CED*
The MAA for RisperdalConsta LR in schizophrenia in
France [11,12]
cohort provisional CED*
For review of the schemes see [3,7,10,38].
*- unfavourable CED results assumed reduction of list price of the drug and is some cases also a rebate of money for sold packages
**-one PAS assumed price reduction in case of unfavourable results of an ongoing clinical trial versus a comparator drug
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All PAS did not require collection of data from cohorts
of patients. In the case of pazopanib, the scheme
assumed a value rebate and subsequent price reduction
in the event that the drug fails to prove its non-inferior-
ity in an ongoing head-to-head clinical trial versus one
of the comparators (sunitinib). In the remaining cases,
PAS did not envisage scheduled price revision (in UK
drug list prices are notified by manufacturers to the
MoH) or any other final decision making with respect
to these drugs. Nevertheless, we note that the 2009
Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme stipulates that
when designing PAS, clarity is required on the exact
duration of any agreement and the circumstances in
which it might be terminated [22] and that NICE sche-
dules regular revisions of its drug appraisals so that the
HTA recommendations are subject to change.
Apart from the above MAA developed as a part of
NICE drug appraisal process, the UK’s DoH launched in
2002 a MAA for b-interferons and glatiramer in the
treatment of multiple sclerosis (MS). This experimental
scheme was agreed with four manufacturers of disease-
modifying MS drugs and assumed collection and analy-
sis of health outcomes (Expanded Disability Status
Scale) data from a cohort of approximately 10,000
patients, followed for over 10 years. Briefly, the cost of
drugs incurred by the NHS would be reduced if a new
ICER estimate calculated over an envisaged 20-year hor-
izon was above £35,000/QALY [3,37].
Interestingly, there was no synergy between construc-
tion of UK’s and Italian schemes for the same drugs, e.g.
bortezomib (in multiple myeloma) which was available
in UK within a payment-for-performance (per patient)
agreement, in Italy was reimbursed within a MAA that
featured a fixed cost-share (per patient) and a discount
(from the list price).
Classification of Market Access Agreements Revisited
Based on the above review of the MAA we propose that
the approach to the collection and analysis of patient
health outcomes data by payers (none, cohort or per
patient) and the timeframe of the agreement (provisional
or permanent) can be used to classify them into three
major categories: Commercial Agreements (CA), Pay-
ment for Performance Agreements (P4P) and Coverage
with Evidence Development (CED). This classification is
meant to help the reader quickly identify the underlying
concepts of various MAA they may come across in their
practice. Table 2 attempts to define these types of MAA
by summarizing their major features and by giving rele-
vant examples.
CA typically aim at reduction of expenditure on costly
drugs for the health care payer, without collecting and
analyzing real-life health outcomes data from patients.
While in principle they can be renegotiated, they are
permanent agreements in a sense that they do not
assume a future final reimbursement decision in light of
new data on pre-specified health outcomes from a well-
designed study.
While CED agreements are provisional by nature and
involve running a health outcomes study on a cohort of
patients, P4P are managed on a per patient basis with-
out attempting to answer uncertainty about drug’sc o s t -
or clinical-effectiveness. In other words, while CED
always leads to a scheduled reassessment of the drug’s
(cost-) effectiveness, price revision and to regular reim-
bursement status, P4P is set to pay only for patients
who achieve a pre-specified response to a drug. While
P4P must involve defining individual patient’sr e s p o n s e ,
it does not have the potential to deliver high-quality
data on drug’s actual (cost-) effectiveness and does not
lead to a more evidence-based reimbursement decision
or HTA recommendation.
We note that CED itself can be a costly process as it
involves purchasing the medicine for patients. Therefore,
it is not surprising that e.g. Italian AIFA chose to pay
only for responding patients during the CRONOS CED.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the main objective of the
scheme was to develop new evidence on real-life health
outcomes from a cohort of patients which would enable
a final reimbursement decision and therefore it can be
classified as CED.
Further, medicines in some P4P schemes in Italy were
purchased with a discount from the list price. Since
AIFA documentation did not refer to cost-effectiveness
per se, the main objective of the schemes was to enable
positive reimbursement recommendation on these drugs
while ensuring a lower budgetary impact. Supposedly,
the agency felt that the financial outlays would be too
high even if only treatment of responding patients was
financed and therefore sought to agree with the manu-
facturers on discounts from list prices of concerned
drugs. Therefore, those schemes can be classified as
P4P/CA
We show in the last column in Table 1 how the MAA
which we reviewed here can be categorized according to
this classification (for a detailed review of the schemes
see [3,7,10,38])
Performance and the future of MAA
Some academics argue that P4P or CED are implemen-
ted when the payer perceives high risk related to paying
for a medicine (it is uncertain that financing a costly
drug is good value for money), and the manufacturer is
confident that the product has good efficacy (value)
[39]. The payer’s uncertainty is more pronounced in the
case of newly launched medicines or old ones for which
no post-marketing data exists. This is because drugs are
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cal trials performed often on selected patient popula-
tions and payers are concerned about the drug’sr e a l -
practice effectiveness in general patient population and/
or about its impact on use of other resources in the
health care system. From that perspective, the ultimate
goal of P4P and CED for a payer should be therefore
minimization of a possibility that it finances a technol-
ogy that is not (cost-) effective in real-life use [40].
However, we believe that there is a substantial difference
between attempting to reduce the financial outlays of
purchasing a costly medicine because it is not consid-
ered value for money and seeking to develop clearly spe-
cified real life evidence to reduce payer’s uncertainty
about the value of the drug. As we discuss below, while
P4P can merely improve payer’s acceptability to finance
a costly medicine, CED actually addresses the uncer-
tainty related to the decision to finance a medicine.
In Sweden, the two CED discussed earlier enabled the
payer to collect evidence that led to re-evaluation of the
real-life cost-effectiveness of concerned drugs and final
reimbursement and pricing decisions were delivered.
Following these decisions, the drugs were financed with-
out employing any further MAA.
In the case of French CED for RisperdalConsta LP,
five years after the initial HAS ruling of minor improve-
ment of clinical benefit (Amelioration du Service Medi-
cal Rendu (ASMR) IV), the requested study provided
evidence that in a cohort of over 1600 patients followed
for 1 year, patients treated with the concerned drug had
a lower relative risk of hospitalization than those on
other antipsychotics [11] and so the premium list price
has been maintained. On the other hand, the observa-
tional study for rosiglitazone (AVANCE) largely
repeated the efficacy data which had been shown in
clinical trials and therefore did not support manufac-
turers’ claims of a superior real-life efficacy [12,41]. As a
consequence of this result the pricing committee CEPS
cut the drug’s price by 30%, requested rebates for the
drug already purchased and altered the reimbursement
level from 65% to 35%. However, no systematic informa-
tion on the actual amounts of the rebates was published
by HAS.
On the other hand, the experimental CED for MS
drugs in UK was inconclusive at seven years from its
launch. While access to the drugs varied across the UK
and remained the lowest among peer countries [42], the
evidence on the drugs’ efficacy that was gathered from a
cohort of over 5,500 patients did not reduce uncertainty
surrounding the ICER to a level that would allow price
revision [43].
While the design of Patient Access Schemes (PAS)
developed as a part of NICE appraisal process addresses
uncertainty about the ICER estimate from cost-effective-
ness analysis [38], there have been issues with their real-
life performance and savings brought to the NHS. A
report from the British Oncology Pharmacy Association
concluded that hospital pharmacies would rather not
Table 2 Definitions and examples of the three types of Market Access Agreements
MAA Category Commercial
Agreement
Payment for Performance Agreement Coverage with Evidence Development
Contract type ￿ Discount-based
contract
￿ Permanent risk-shifting agreement (outcomes
guarantee/insurance) applied on a per-patient
basis
￿ Provisional agreement until new, clearly




outcomes data by the
payer






￿ Permanent/not linked to final decision-making
based on new robust evidence
￿ Temporary/provisional until new evidence






￿ Avoiding inefficient expenditure on treating
patients who do not respond to a drug and
who cannot be identified ex ante (by
permanently linking the payment to drug’s
performance in individual patients)
￿ Reducing uncertainty about drug’s real-life
effectiveness (by linking a final HTA,
reimbursement and/or pricing decision to
drug’s performance in a cohort of patients,
during a defined test period)







￿ Payment for performance
￿ Pay-back for non performance
￿ Temporary coverage on a condition that new
evidence reduces uncertainty about a pre-
specified health outcome:
- Real-life effectiveness
- Higher efficacy in a pre-specified
subpopulation of patients
- Long-term effect
- Improved patient’s adherence
- Reduction of use of health care resources (e.g.
hospitalization)
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ward discount [44]. Further, data from 31 hospitals in
the UK showed that, between 2007 and 2009, 47% of
manufacturer pay-backs arising from sunitinib and bor-
tezomib PAS were not recovered by Primary Care
Trusts [45]. It is not surprising that the chair of NICE,
Sir Michael Rawlins has said recently that “(...) a simple
discount may eliminate the need to put in place compli-
cated schemes that require substantial management
input” [46]. He further suggested the initial discounts
that could replace complex schemes should amount to
about 30% of the list price. Nevertheless, it is arguably
too early to judge the performance of those schemes.
Further, a recent PAS for gefitinib is a sign that NICE
and DoH continue to develop MAAs being a mix of
P4P and CA, but give more consideration to prior
assessment of their future administrative impact.
The Italian AIFA announced that following an analysis
of patients’ registries which were a part of P4P and CA
agreements for expensive cancer drugs, it would reduce
their list price by 30-40% in 2011 [47]. While scheduled
price revision was assumed at the launch of these P4P
schemes, they had not been designed to answer uncer-
tainty about (cost-) effectiveness of the drugs and it is
unlikely that the registry data had the sufficient quality
to provide more robust estimates than those available at
drugs’ launch.
On the other hand, the Italian CED for AD drugs
(CRONOS), provided new real-life effectiveness data
and allowed AIFA to reimburse these medicines, with
some restrictions with respect to diagnosis and conti-
nuation of treatment and prescription limited to specia-
list physicians [48].
The payers had a diversity of approaches towards how
to sponsor provision of the drug for patients during its
testing CED period. In France, drugs in one CED were
financed by the payer at a premium price, but in case of
unfavourable results the difference between the cost of a
cheaper comparator and the premium price was
returned to the payer. In Sweden, the drugs were
f i n a n c e da tap r e m i u mp r i c ea n di nI t a l ya tap r e m i u m
price with payment limited to patients who responded
to treatment (for the CRONOS MAA). In UK, the MS
disease-modifying drugs were financed at a premium
price, but the scheme assumed sliding reduction of the
price as soon as unfavourable interim evidence from the
CED becomes available.
Finally, as we noted earlier, almost all European
national health care payers use list prices in peer coun-
tries to set drug prices. Clearly, CA and P4P obscure the
real financial outlay of concerned drugs to the payer
who agreed on them and the list price becomes mean-
ingless for international referencing. This is also the
case if drugs in CED are financed by the payer at a
premium list price as the drug will likely be launched
(and priced) in other countries during the CED period.
For that reason we are of opinion that the industry
chooses to propose such schemes to payers because of
their interest in maintaining high list prices. The payers
agree because such MAA allow them to reduce financial
outlays on costly medicines in their own countries.
Unfortunately, as a “side effect” of such policy, prices in
peer countries might be set with reference to the argu-
ably unwarranted, “facial” list price. However, if the real
drug’s price (i.e. the financial outlay to the payer)
becomes available for reference, the industry might lose
their interest in this often sophisticated form of con-
tracting and lean towards rethinking of their pricing
strategies. This is currently not possible as details of
many MAA are held under Commercial in Confidence
agreements and also because real spending on drugs in
MAA is not published by payers in a systematic manner.
At the same time, patient registry data is not available to
third parties for independent analysis.
Summary
It appears from our discussion that well designed and
transparent CED have proven to be a powerful tool
which enables reduction of uncertainty about drug’s
real-life performance. The examples of CED developed
in France, Italy and Sweden, suggest that reducing
payer’s uncertainty about drugs value is indeed feasible,
shall this be the true motivation of payers. While CA
and P4P have a potential to incur savings to individual
national payers, care should be taken that the real cost
of purchasing drugs in MAA, rather than their list price,
is used for international reference pricing in Europe.
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